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Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea: Survey for 2017 
Robin Churchill 
Emeritus Professor of International Law, University of Dundee, Dundee, UK 
Abstract 
This is the latest in a series of annual surveys in this Journal reviewing dispute 
settlement in the law of the sea, both under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
and outside the framework of the Convention. It covers developments in 2017. The 
most significant developments during the year were the judgment of the Special 
Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the Ghana/Côte 
d’Ivoire maritime boundary case and the final award of the tribunal in the 
Croatia/Slovenia arbitration. There were also a number of less significant 
developments.   
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Introduction  
 
This is the latest in a series of annual surveys in this Journal reviewing dispute 
settlement in the law of the sea. It covers developments in 2017 and follows the 
structure of previous surveys. It therefore begins by looking at dispute settlement 
under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).1 It examines in turn the 
activities of the various forums for the compulsory settlement of disputes under Part 
XV of the LOSC, namely the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), arbitration in accordance with Annex VII, 
arbitration under Annex VIII and conciliation. It then continues by looking at judicial 
settlement of law of the sea disputes outside the framework of Part XV, considering in 
turn the work of the ICJ and arbitral tribunals. 
The most significant developments during 2017 were the judgment of the 
Special Chamber of the ITLOS in the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire maritime boundary case 
and the award of the tribunal in the Croatia/Slovenia arbitration. The former is notable 
for being the third occasion on which an international court or tribunal has delimited a 
continental shelf boundary beyond 200 nautical miles (nm) from the baselines and for 
what the Special Chamber said about the obligations of States in undelimited areas of 
overlapping maritime zones. The chief interest of the latter case is the arbitral 
tribunal’s pronouncements on the status and delimitation of bays bounded by more 
than one State, and the prescription of a special regime in an area of Croatia’s 
territorial sea for ships and aircraft travelling to and from Slovenia that somewhat 
resembles a judgment ex aequo et bono.  
                                                 
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 16 
November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3. 
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Other developments during 2017 include an award of compensation by the 
Annex VII arbitral tribunal in the Arctic Sunrise case and the judgment of the ICJ on 
jurisdiction and admissibility in the Somalia/Kenya maritime boundary case. 2017 
was also notable for being the first year since 2006 when no new judicial proceedings 
for the settlement of a law of the sea dispute were instituted. 
 
 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea  
 
Administrative and Organizational Matters  
The most important organizational matter during 2017 was the seventh triennial 
election of judges to the ITLOS, held on 14 June at the 27th Meeting of States Parties. 
Articles 4 and 5 of Annex VI of the LOSC provide that one third of the 21 judges of 
the ITLOS are to retire every three years and that elections are to be held at a meeting 
of States parties to fill the seven vacancies thus created. Retiring judges are eligible 
for re-election. For the seventh triennial elections, 13 candidates were nominated:2 
that is about the average of the number of candidates at previous triennial elections. 
The candidates in 2017 included four of the seven retiring judges (Judges Akl, 
Bouguetaia, Jesus and Wolfrum).3 The Meeting of States Parties agreed that the 
elections would be based on the confirmed regional allocation of seats4 and would be 
                                                 
2 UN doc. SPLOS/308 (15 March 2017). For the curricula vitae of the candidates, see SPLOS/309 (21 
March 2017). One candidate withdrew before the elections took place. SPLOS documents are available 
at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/meeting_states_parties/SPLOS_documents.htm#Reports%20of%20the%2
0Meetings; accessed 31 May 2018. 
3 The judges not seeking re-election were Judges Chandrasekhara Rao (India) and Golitsyn (Russia). 
The seventh judge, Judge Cachapuz de Madeiros (Brazil), died not long before the expiry of his term of 
office.    
4 That is: two each from the Group of African States and the Group of Asia-Pacific States and one each 
from the Eastern European, Latin American and Caribbean, and West European and Others Groups. 
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conducted in one step.5 The ballot resulted in the re-election of Judges Bouguetaia 
(Algeria) and Jesus (Cape Verde), and the election of five new judges, Mr Óscar 
Cabello Sarubhi (Paraguay), Ms Neeru Chadha (India), Professor Kriangsak 
Kittichaisaree (Thailand), Mr Roman Kolodkin (Russia) and Ms Liesbeth Lijnzaad 
(Netherlands).6 Thus, Judges Akl (Lebanon) and Wolfrum (Germany) were not re-
elected: both had been members of the ITLOS since its inception in 1996.  
The five new judges represent the largest injection of “new blood” into the 
ITLOS since the 2005 elections. It is welcome that two of them are women. The 
ITLOS now has three female members, the same number as the International Court of 
Justice, although a smaller proportion – one seventh as against one fifth. As regards 
the backgrounds of the new judges, all have had their primary careers in their 
respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs, most as legal advisers. Some have also held 
part-time academic appointments. Professor Kittichaisaree and Mr Kolodkin are also 
past members of the International Law Commission.7 Mr Kolodkin is the son of one 
of the original judges of the ITLOS, Judge Anatoly Kolodkin. 
The beginning of the eighth triennium of the ITLOS on 1 October 2017 meant 
not only the beginning of the period of office of the newly elected judges, but also the 
election of a new president and vice-president of the ITLOS. Judges Paik and Attard 
were elected President and Vice-President, respectively, for a three-year period 
expiring on 30 September 2020.8 At the same time the five standing Chambers of the 
ITLOS were reconstituted.9 
                                                 
5 Report of the twenty-seventh Meeting of States Parties, SPLOS/316 (10 July 2017), para. 75.   
6 Ibid., para. 76 and Annex II.  
7 This biographical information on the new judges has been taken from SPLOS/309 (n 2).  
8 ITLOS Press Release 266 (2 October 2017), available at https://www.itlos.org/press-media/press-
releases/press-releases-2017/; accessed 22 May 2018.  
9 For details, see ITLOS Press Release 267 (6 October 2017), available at ibid. 
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During 2017 the ITLOS held its usual two sessions (in March and 
September/October) devoted to administrative and legal matters not directly related to 
cases. At those sessions the ITLOS discussed, inter alia, issues relating to its 
jurisdiction, its Rules (including questions relating to the publication of initial reports 
by parties in provisional measures cases) and its judicial procedures.10 The ITLOS 
also continued its capacity-building activities. The training programme on the LOSC 
dispute settlement system, established with the financial backing of the Nippon 
Foundation in 2007, supported seven fellows for the period July 2017 to March 
2018.11 The internship programme (which began in 1997) continued, with 16 people 
from 15 different States benefitting from the programme in 2017. Since 1997 a total 
of 337 persons from 95 different States have participated in the programme.12 Over 
the years the ITLOS has held regional workshops on dispute settlement in the law of 
the sea. In 2017 (in June) it held a workshop in Costa Rica. The subject of the 
workshop was the role of the ITLOS in the settlement of disputes relating to the law 
of the sea in the Central American and Caribbean region.13  
 
Judicial Activities 
 
At the beginning of 2017 two cases were ongoing before the ITLOS – Case No. 23, a 
maritime boundary dispute brought by Ghana against Côte d’Ivoire, and Case No 25, 
M/V Norstar, concerning the seizure and detention of a Panamanian vessel by Italy. In 
the latter case the whole of 2017 was taken up with the written proceedings phase of 
                                                 
10 Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for 2017, SPLOS/317 (26 March 
2018), paras. 41 and 68-70, available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/meeting_states_parties/twentyeighthmeetingstatesparties.htm; accessed 31 
May 2018. 
11 Ibid., at para. 125. 
12 Ibid., at paras. 121-2. 
13 Ibid., at para. 127. 
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the case, which had not been completed at the year’s end. However, in the 
Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire case the Special Chamber delivered its judgment on 23 
September 2017, and this is analysed below.  
  
Case No. 23: Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary 
between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean  
In September 2014 Ghana instituted arbitral proceedings against Côte d’Ivoire under 
Annex VII in respect of their maritime boundary dispute. In December 2014 the 
parties agreed to transfer the dispute from an Annex VII arbitral tribunal to a special 
chamber in accordance with Article 15(2) of Annex VI of the LOSC, the special 
chamber comprising Judges Bouguetaia (president), Wolfrum and Paik and Judges ad 
hoc Mensah and Abraham. In February 2015 Côte d’Ivoire made a request to the 
Special Chamber for the prescription of a number of provisional measures. In 
response the Special Chamber made an order requiring Ghana to ensure that no new 
drilling took place in the disputed area; to prevent information obtained from 
exploration activities in the disputed area that was not already in the public domain 
from being used in any way whatsoever to the detriment of Côte d’Ivoire; and to carry 
out strict and continuous monitoring of all existing activities in the disputed area in 
order to prevent serious harm to the marine environment. In addition, the Special 
Chamber ordered both parties to take all necessary steps to prevent serious harm to 
the marine environment in the disputed area, to cooperate to that end, and to refrain 
from any unilateral action that might aggravate the dispute.14 
                                                 
14 Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the 
Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), Order of 25 April 2015, [2015] ITLOS Rep. 146. The Order 
was discussed in a previous Survey: see R. Churchill, ‘Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea: 
Survey for 2015, Part I’ (2016) 31 IJMCL 555-82 at 570-6. 
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 On 23 September 2017 the Special Chamber delivered its judgment on the 
merits.15 The judgment deals with six main issues: (1) the possible existence of a tacit 
boundary agreement; (2) delimitation of the maritime boundary within 200 nm of the 
baselines; (3) delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm; (4) Ghana’s 
alleged violation of Côte d’Ivoire’s sovereign rights; (5) Ghana’s alleged violation of 
Article 83 of the LOSC; and (6) Ghana’s alleged violation of the Special Chamber’s 
provisional measures order.   
 
The possible existence a tacit boundary agreement  
Ghana argued that the parties had had an informal understanding since the 1960s that 
the boundary was an equidistance line and this was reflected in their practice in 
licensing hydrocarbon activities on their respective continental shelves. Furthermore, 
when each party made a submission to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2009 relating to the establishment of the outer limit of 
their continental shelves beyond 200 nm, neither party showed the limit of its 
                                                 
15 Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the 
Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), Judgment of 23 September 2017, available at 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/C23_Judgment_23.09.2017_
corr.pdf; accessed 30 May 2017. For early comment on the judgment, see N. Bankes, ‘ITLOS 
Judgment in the Maritime Boundary Dispute between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire’, Jebsen Centre for the 
Law of the Sea, Tromsø (JCLOS) Blog, posted 27 October 2017, available at 
http://site.uit.no/jclos/2017/10/27/itlos-judgment-in-the-maritime-boundary-dispute-between-ghana-
and-cote-divoire/; accessed 1 June 2018; S. V. Busch, ‘Opposite or Adjacent – Does it make a 
difference? Delimiting the Continental Shelf beyond 200 nm’, JCLOS Blog, posted 1 December 2017, 
available at http://site.uit.no/jclos/2017/12/01/opposite-or-adjacent-does-it-make-a-difference-
delimiting-the-continental-shelf-beyond-200-nm/; accessed 1 June 2018; N. Ermolina and C. 
Yiallorides, ‘State Responsibility for Unilateral Hydrocarbon Activities in Disputed Maritime Areas: 
The Case of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire and its Implications’, JCLOS Blog, posted 23 November 2017, 
available at http://site.uit.no/jclos/2017/11/23/state-responsibility-for-unilateral-hydrocarbon-activities-
in-disputed-maritime-areas-the-case-of-ghana-and-cote-divoire-and-its-implications/; accessed 1 June 
2018; A. Oude Elferink, ‘Maritime Delimitation in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire: Predictability . . . with an 
Occasional Glitch’, JCLOS Blog, posted 6 February 2018, available at 
http://site.uit.no/jclos/2018/02/06/maritime-delimitation-in-ghana-cote-divoire-predictability-with-an-
occasional-glitch/; accessed 1 June 2018; and C. Yiallourides, ‘Analysis of Dispute concerning 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean’, Parts 
I and II, EJIL: Talk! Blog, posted 19 and 20 October 2017, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-i-
analysis-of-dispute-concerning-delimitation-of-the-maritime-boundary-between-ghana-and-cote-
divoire-in-the-atlantic-ocean/; accessed 1 June 2018. 
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continental shelf as extending beyond the equidistance line. It was only from 2009 
onwards, according to Ghana, that Côte d’Ivoire began to argue that the boundary 
should be a different line. That line was to the east (i.e. on Ghana’s side) of the 
equidistance line. The area between the two lines within 200 nm of the baselines (the 
disputed area) is approximately 9,000 nm2.16 Ghana has authorised exploration and 
exploitation of oil and gas in the disputed area for many years. 
 After reviewing the arguments and evidence relating to a possible tacit 
maritime boundary presented by the parties, the Special Chamber recalled the dictum 
of the ICJ in the Nicaragua/Honduras case that “[e]vidence of a tacit agreement on a 
maritime boundary must be compelling.”17 In the present case the Special Chamber 
did not find the evidence presented by Ghana “compelling”. The practice of the 
parties in awarding oil concessions that did not extend beyond the equidistance line 
“cannot in itself establish the existence of a tacit agreement on a maritime boundary” 
(para. 215). It might reflect the existence of a maritime boundary, or it might be 
explained by other reasons, such as the desire to avoid conflict with the other party. 
Furthermore, such practice related at most to a continental shelf boundary, not to 
boundaries for other maritime zones. Nor did various pieces of legislation quoted by 
Ghana provide compelling evidence of a maritime boundary. By contrast, the fact that 
the parties had at times engaged in negotiations on a maritime boundary contradicted 
the idea of a tacit agreement, as did their submissions to the CLCS.  
                                                 
16 Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the 
Atlantic Ocean, Request for the prescription of provisional measures by Côte d’Ivoire, 27 February 
2015, para. 7, available at 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_prov_meas/C23_Request_prov_mea
sures_translation_Reg.pdf; accessed 4 June 2018. 
17 Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea 
(Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 2007, p. 659, 735.  
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The Special Chamber also rejected an argument by Ghana that Côte d’Ivoire 
was estopped from denying that the maritime boundary was an equidistance line as it 
was essentially based on the same facts as Ghana’s argument for the existence of a 
tacit agreement on a maritime boundary. The fact that there was no such agreement 
meant that the Special Chamber’s task was now to delimit a boundary for all the 
parties’ maritime zones (territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf (both within and 
beyond 200 nm from the baselines)) de novo.    
 
Delimitation of the maritime boundary within 200 nm of the baselines 
For the territorial sea boundary, rather than apply Article 15 of the LOSC (which 
deals with the delimitation of territorial sea boundaries), the Special Chamber 
interpreted the submissions of the parties to the effect that it should use the same 
delimitation methodology for the territorial sea as for the EEZ and continental shelf, 
especially as neither party had raised “sovereignty-related considerations in respect of 
delimitation of the territorial sea” (paras. 259 and 262). Thus, the Special Chamber 
delimited the boundary between all the overlapping zones of the parties within 200 
nm as a single exercise. Nevertheless, it emphasised that under the LOSC different 
rules apply to the delimitation of the territorial sea than to delimitation of the EEZ and 
continental shelf. 
 As for the methodology for delimiting a single maritime boundary, Côte 
d’Ivoire had argued that the Special Chamber should use the angle-bisector method in 
view of both the macro-geography and the coastal micro-geography and the small 
number of basepoints, which were located on a short stretch of coastline, part of 
which was unstable. The Special Chamber rejected those arguments. The macro-
geography (i.e. the interests of neighbouring States) was irrelevant. The coastline of 
9
the delimitation area was generally straight, with no offshore features such as islands, 
nor was it unstable: accordingly, even though the number of basepoints might be 
limited, the geography of the area did not call for the angle-bisector method. 
Furthermore, the judicial precedents relied on by Côte d’Ivoire were not relevant to 
the situation in this case. As to the method of delimitation that it would use, the 
Special Chamber observed that “[i]nternational jurisprudence confirms, that in the 
absence of any compelling reasons that make it impossible or inappropriate to draw a 
provisional equidistance line, the equidistance-relevant circumstances methodology 
should be chosen for maritime delimitation . . . a delimitation methodology which has 
been practised overwhelmingly by international courts and tribunals in recent 
decades” (para. 289). As there were no such compelling reasons, this was the 
methodology that it would use. 
 Accordingly, the Special Chamber began by drawing an equidistance line. As 
the agreed terminus of the parties’ land boundary was not on the low-water line, the 
Special Chamber extended the general direction of that boundary until it intersected 
with the low-water line. That point then became the starting point of the equidistance 
line, which was constructed using basepoints selected by the Special Chamber, rather 
than the basepoints proposed by the parties or the baselines set out in the parties’ 
national legislation. The Special Chamber’s method of constructing an equidistance 
line produced a large number of basepoints, which to simplify matters it reduced in 
number. The resulting line was described by the Special Chamber as a “simplified 
provisional equidistance line” (para. 400).  
The next stage of the equidistance/relevant circumstances method was to 
consider whether there were any relevant circumstances that would require adjustment 
of the equidistance line. Côte d’Ivoire argued that there were three sets of 
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circumstances that were relevant. First, it argued that the configuration of the parties’ 
coasts, in particular the concavity of its own coast and the convexity of Ghana’s coast, 
cut off its maritime zones in front of its coast. The Special Chamber rejected that 
argument. The configuration of the coasts was not such as to have a significant cut-off 
effect warranting adjustment of the equidistance line. Second, Côte d’Ivoire argued 
that the Jomoro peninsula, located at the western end of Ghana’s coast, blocked off 
the Ivorian land mass. That argument was also dismissed. The “geographical 
particularity of Jamoro does not justify treating it as an island on the wrong side of an 
equidistance line [as Côte d’Ivoire had contended], or as a peninsula protruding into 
the sea” (para. 434). Last, Côte d’Ivoire claimed the exceptional presence of 
hydrocarbons in the disputed area was a relevant circumstance. That argument was 
again rejected. According to established jurisprudence, the location of economic 
resources was a not relevant circumstance in maritime delimitation. For its part, 
Ghana argued that the conduct of the parties relating to the granting of oil concessions 
was a relevant circumstance. The Special Chamber regarded that as essentially an 
attempt to revive Ghana’s argument about a tacitly agreed boundary. Having rejected 
the latter, it would undermine that finding if the Special Chamber were now to regard 
the conduct of the parties as a relevant circumstance. In any case that conduct was 
relevant only to the seabed, not water column, of an all-purpose boundary.  
Overall, therefore, the Special Chamber found that there were no relevant 
circumstances requiring the adjustment of its simplified provisional equidistance line. 
The third stage of the equidistance/relevant circumstance method calls for the 
application of a disproportionality test. The Special Chamber deferred applying that 
test until after it had delimited the continental shelf boundary beyond 200 nm, a 
matter that it considered next.               
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 Delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm 
This was the third occasion on which an international court or tribunal had engaged in 
delimiting a continental shelf boundary beyond 200 nm from the baselines, following 
the two Bay of Bengal cases. In the present case, the Special Chamber followed the 
approach of the ITLOS in the Bangladesh/Myanmar case18 in deciding that it had 
jurisdiction in principle to delimit a continental shelf boundary between the parties 
beyond 200 nm from the baselines, but that it should only do so in practice if it was 
satisfied that the continental shelves of the parties extended beyond 200 nm. It was so 
satisfied. Ghana had already received recommendations from the CLCS that 
established that its continental shelf extended beyond 200 nm and it was evident that 
the continental shelf of Côte d’Ivoire, in respect of which recommendations from the 
CLCS in response to Côte d’Ivoire’s submission were awaited, must also extend 
beyond 200 nm “since its geological situation is identical to that of Ghana” (para 
491). 
When it came to the method of delimitation, the Special Chamber adopted, 
with virtually no discussion, the same methodology as the Bangladesh/Myanmar case 
for delimiting the continental shelf boundary beyond 200 nm, based on the same 
reasoning. Accordingly, it decided that the boundary between the two parties’ 
overlapping continental shelves beyond 200 nm would be a continuation of its 
simplified provisional equidistance line from the 200 nm limit until it met the outer 
limits of the continental shelf.  
                                                 
18 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, 
ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 4. 
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The Special Chamber then turned to apply the disproportionality test. This test 
requires a comparison of the ratio of the lengths of the parties’ relevant coasts (those 
coasts generating overlapping projections of each party’s maritime zones) with the 
ratio of those parts of the relevant area, both within and beyond 200 nm, resulting to 
each party from the delimitation process up to this point. The Special Chamber found 
that the first ratio was 1: 2.53 in Côte d’Ivoire’s favour, and the second 1: 2.02, also in 
Côte d’Ivoire’s favour. The Special Chamber held that the relationship between those 
ratios “does not entail such disproportionality as to constitute an inequitable result” 
(para. 538). Accordingly, the simplified provisional equidistance line would constitute 
the boundary between all the overlapping maritime zones of the parties, both within 
and beyond 200 nm. That boundary is much the same as the equidistance line that 
Ghana claimed was already the boundary, except that the starting points of the two 
lines are some 40 metres apart and the lines were constructed using different 
basepoints. However, the differences in the areas resulting to the parties from each 
line are probably very small.       
 
Ghana’s alleged violation of Côte d’Ivoire’s sovereign rights 
Having delimited the maritime boundary, the Special Chamber turned to address Côte 
d’Ivoire’s claim invoking Ghana’s international responsibility. Côte d’Ivoire alleged 
violations by that Ghana of three different matters: Côte d’Ivoire’s sovereign rights; 
Article 83 of the LOSC; and the Special Chamber’s provisional measures order. The 
first question was whether the Special Chamber had jurisdiction to consider those 
matters. It found that it had an inherent jurisdiction to consider the third matter. It also 
had jurisdiction to consider the first two matters. Such jurisdiction was conferred, not 
from the parties’ agreement referring the case to the Special Chamber (which was 
13
limited to the maritime boundary issue), but from the conduct of the parties during the 
proceedings which made it evident that they agreed to consideration of Ghana’s 
international responsibility by the Special Chamber. The latter labels this basis of 
jurisdiction as “forum prorogatum” (para. 552). That appears to be a somewhat 
debatable basis for jurisdiction. Côte d’Ivoire’s allegations were essentially a counter-
claim, although admittedly not labelled as such, and might therefore have been better 
dealt with under Rule 98 of the ITLOS Rules, which covers counter-claims and their 
admissibility.19 To address the merits of Côte d’Ivoire’s claim, Article 293 permitted 
the Special Chamber to apply not only the LOSC but also other rules of international 
law not incompatible with it. The Special Chamber would therefore apply the general 
rules on State responsibility, which were found in customary international law as 
reflected in the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility.  
 Côte d’Ivoire’s first claim was that Ghana had violated its sovereign rights by 
engaging in exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in the disputed area before 
the boundary had been delimited. It argued that because States’ sovereign rights over 
their continental shelves were inherent and exclusive, international law required a 
State to refrain from any unilateral economic activity in a disputed area of continental 
shelf, pending its definitive delimitation, since it might violate the sovereign rights of 
the other State should the disputed area eventually be attributed to the latter. The 
Special Chamber rejected that argument, holding that “maritime activities undertaken 
by a State in an area of continental shelf which has been attributed to another State by 
an international judgment cannot be considered to be in violation of the sovereign 
                                                 
19 Rule 98 of the ITLOS Rules is very similar to Article 80 of the ICJ’s Rules, which is discussed 
below: see text following (n 38).   
14
rights of the latter if those activities were carried out before the judgment was 
delivered and if the area concerned was the subject of claims made in good faith by 
both States” (para. 592). It therefore dismissed Côte d’Ivoire’s claim that Ghana’s 
activities in the disputed area prior to its judgment was a breach of Côte d’Ivoire’s 
rights.  
That ruling is not very satisfactory. The Special Chamber gave no authority to 
support its ruling other than a brief quotation from the Nicaragua/Colombia case on a 
similar, though not identical, point,20 which was itself unsupported. It seems difficult 
to reconcile the ruling with the obligation in Article 83(3) of the LOSC not to 
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a boundary agreement, at least as interpreted and 
applied by the tribunal in the Guyana/Suriname case (discussed below), and the 
Special Chamber’s own order of provisional measures in the present case 
(summarized above). The reference to “claims made in good faith” might suggest that 
the principle contained in the ruling applied only to those areas of overlap that could 
plausibly be claimed by both States. However, the Special Chamber’s observation that 
“in a case of overlap both States concerned have an entitlement to the relevant 
continental shelf on the basis of their relevant coasts” (para. 591) suggests that the 
principle applies to the whole of the overlapping area. Furthermore, from a policy 
perspective the principle is undesirable as it may encourage unilateral hydrocarbon 
activity in disputed areas. The principle as enunciated was probably wider than was 
necessary to decide the case, since Ghana appears not to have undertaken any 
activities on what turned to be Côte d’Ivoire’s side of the boundary line (although the 
Special Chamber did not make any finding on that point). Read literally, the Special 
                                                 
20 See Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) case, Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 
2012, p. 624, 718 (para. 250). 
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Chamber’s principle is confined to the situation where a boundary has been 
determined by a court and not to the position before a boundary has been subject to 
possible adjudication. Because of the policy implications referred to, the narrowest 
possible reading of the Special Chamber’s principle should be preferred.        
 
Ghana’s alleged violation of Article 83 of the LOSC 
Côte d’Ivoire’s second claim was that Ghana had violated paragraphs 1 and 3 of 
Article 83 of the LOSC. Paragraph 1 provides that “[t]he delimitation of the 
continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by 
agreement on the basis of international law . . . in order to achieve an equitable 
solution.” Côte d’Ivoire argued that Ghana’s unilateral activities in the disputed area 
and inflexibility in the negotiations, together with the fact that Ghana had foreclosed 
the possibility of settling the boundary dispute by judicial means by making a 
declaration under Article 298 of the LOSC that was not withdrawn until it instituted 
proceedings in the present case, violated the obligation to negotiate in good faith 
required by Article 83(1). The Special Chamber rejected that argument. While it was 
true that Article 83(1) “necessarily entails negotiations” to reach a delimitation 
agreement, it was an obligation of conduct, not of result (para. 604). However, Ghana 
had not violated that obligation because it had participated in 10 rounds of boundary 
negotiations over a period of six years and there was no evidence that those 
negotiations were not meaningful. Foreclosing the possibility of judicial settlement 
was not a breach of the obligation to negotiate as Article 298 specifically permitted 
such foreclosure.    
Paragraph 3 of Article 83 provides that “[p]ending agreement as provided for 
in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, 
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shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature 
and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the 
final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final 
delimitation.” Côte d’Ivoire argued that Ghana’s activities in the disputed area both 
made it impossible to conclude a provisional arrangement and jeopardized and 
hampered the conclusion of a definitive delimitation agreement. The Special Chamber 
began its response by observing that Article 83(3) “contains two interlinked 
obligations” (para. 626). The first, relating to provisional arrangements, was an 
obligation of conduct and so did not amount to an obligation to reach an agreement on 
a provisional arrangement, although there was a duty to act in good faith. In the 
present case, it was for Côte d’Ivoire to propose provisional arrangements but it had 
not done so. That failure “bars Côte d’Ivoire from claiming that Ghana has violated its 
obligation to negotiate on such arrangements” (para. 628).  
As for the second obligation in Article 83(3), the Special Chamber noted that 
the phrase “shall make every effort” in Article 83(3) applied to both provisional 
arrangements and the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, thereby qualifying the 
latter as also being an obligation of conduct. The “transitional period” referred to 
Article 83(3) meant “the period after the maritime delimitation dispute has been 
established until after a final delimitation by agreement or adjudication has been 
achieved” (para. 630). The Special Chamber disagreed with Côte d’Ivoire that 
Ghana’s activities in the disputed area during the period after it realised that that area 
was also claimed by Côte d’Ivoire (which appeared to have occurred in 2009), had 
jeopardized or hampered the reaching of a final agreement. This was so for two 
reasons. First, Ghana had suspended drilling operations in the disputed area following 
the order of provisional measures by the Special Chamber. “It would, however, have 
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been preferable if Ghana had adhered to the request of Côte d’Ivoire earlier to 
suspend its hydrocarbon activities in [the undelimited] area” (para. 632). This 
reasoning is unconvincing. The transitional period to which the obligation applies 
clearly began well before the order of provisional measures. To say that it “would 
have been preferable” if Ghana had ceased its activities before the provisional 
measures order is to confuse a legal obligation with an apparently moral one. It is also 
difficult to reconcile the Special Chamber’s decision with the arbitral tribunal’s award 
in the Guyana/Suriname case, the only other case to date in which the obligation not 
to jeopardize or hamper has been considered. In that case the tribunal held that 
drilling for hydrocarbons in an area claimed by both parties to a delimitation dispute 
was a breach of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, and found that Guyana 
had breached that obligation by authorising oil companies to conduct exploratory 
drilling in the disputed area.21  
Returning to the present case, the second reason given by the Special Chamber 
as to why Ghana had not breached the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper was 
because Ghana had only undertaken activities in the area attributed to it by the Special 
Chamber’s line of delimitation, whereas Côte d’Ivoire had claimed a breach of Article 
83(3) by Ghana in respect of its activities in the “Ivorian maritime area” (para. 633). 
Again, this is not convincing as it gives Ghana the benefit of what is arguably simply 
a drafting technicality. Had Côte d’Ivoire been claiming compensation in respect of 
Ghana’s alleged breach of Article 83(3), the Special Chamber’s approach to the 
question might perhaps have been perhaps more understandable, but in fact Côte 
d’Ivoire was seeking no more than a declaration of Ghana’s breach. Unfortunately, 
                                                 
21 Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname (2007), (2012) XXX RIAA 1 at paras. 467-82. 
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the Special Chamber’s approach to the obligation in this case may send the wrong 
signal to other States with unresolved maritime boundaries.22 
   In a separate opinion, Judge Paik expressed disagreement with the 
judgment’s approach to Article 83(3). He voted for the operative part of the judgment 
only because Côte d’Ivoire had limited its claim to the “Ivorian maritime area”. 
“Leaving that formalistic reason aside,” Judge Paik had “serious reservations about 
the correctness of Ghana’s activities in the disputed area in terms” of Article 83(3) 
(para. 1 of Judge Paik’s separate opinion). The reasons given by the judgment in 
support of its conclusion were “insufficient and unconvincing” (ibid.). As to what 
actions would jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final boundary agreement, 
Judge Paik considered that there was no purpose in attempting to identify in general 
and in abstract what actions were permissible and what were not. However, “a key 
criterion is whether the actions in question would have the effect of endangering the 
process of reaching a final agreement or impeding the progress of negotiations to that 
end” (para. 6). The answer to that question depended much on the individual 
circumstances in each case, such as the type, nature, location and time of the actions 
in question, as well as the manner in which they were carried out. In the present case 
Ghana had carried out extensive drilling activities in the disputed area in spite of Côte 
d’Ivoire’s repeated requests that it should abstain from unilateral action. That was 
clearly a breach of Article 83(3) and it was irrelevant that the disputed area was 
eventually allocated to Ghana by the Special Chamber’s boundary line. Judge Paik’s 
approach to Article 83(3) is far more convincing and satisfactory that than of the 
                                                 
22 The criticisms made here about the Special Chamber’s approach to the obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper are broadly shared by Bankes and Ermolina and Yiallourides (n 15). 
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judgment, and it is to be regretted that the other judges did not apparently share his 
view. 
 
Ghana’s alleged violation of the Special Chamber’s provisional measures order 
Côte d’Ivoire argued that Ghana had breached the Special Chamber’s provisional 
measures order by engaging in new drilling and by failing to provide Côte d’Ivoire 
with information on its activities so that Côte d’Ivoire could verify whether Ghana 
was complying with the order. The Special Chamber disagreed. The drilling carried 
out by Ghana was not new but related to ongoing activities aimed at ensuring proper 
production and maintenance of oil deposits, which was permitted under the order. On 
the question of providing information, Ghana had done so, although some information 
was not provided until after the President of the Special Chamber had requested 
Ghana to do so in September 2016. Nevertheless, the Special Chamber concluded that 
Ghana’s conduct “cannot reasonably be considered to constitute a violation” of the 
order (para. 656).    
   
Conclusion 
Overall, Ghana must have felt very satisfied with the outcome of this case, since it 
ended up with its preferred equidistance boundary (even if the Special Chamber 
rejected its argument that such a boundary had already been tacitly agreed) and it was 
found not to have committed the violations of various obligations alleged by Côte 
d’Ivoire. The Special Chamber’s judgment was unanimous on all points. Judge Paik 
and Judge ad hoc Mensah also issued separate opinions. Judge Paik’s separate opinion 
is concerned solely with Article 83(3) of the LOSC and was discussed above. Judge 
20
ad hoc Mensah’s opinion essentially does no more than record his agreement with all 
the main findings of the judgment.        
 
 
The International Court of Justice  
 
As at the beginning of 2017 no cases had been brought before the Court under section 
2 of Part XV of the LOSC and that remained the position at the end of the year. Cases 
relating to the law of the sea brought before the Court in other ways are considered 
below, in the section on Judicial Settlement of Law of the Sea Disputes outside the 
Framework of Section 2 of Part XV of the LOSC. 
   
 
Arbitration in accordance with Annex VII  
 
At the beginning of 2017 four arbitrations conducted under Annex VII of the LOSC 
were ongoing – the compensation phases of the Arctic Sunrise (Netherlands v. Russia) 
and Duzgit Integrity (Malta v. São Tomé and Príncipe) cases, as well as the Enrica 
Lexie Incident (Italy v. India) and Dispute concerning Coastal State Rights in the 
Black Sea, Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait (Ukraine v. Russia) cases. During 2017 the 
tribunal in the Arctic Sunrise case made an award of compensation, while there were 
some developments of note in the Enrica Lexie and Ukraine v. Russia cases. These 
developments are discussed below.  
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  Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia) 
The tribunal hearing this case delivered an award in August 2015 in which it held that 
Russia had breached various obligations under the LOSC that it owed to the 
Netherlands by seizing in its EEZ and subsequently detaining a Dutch-registered 
vessel, the Arctic Sunrise, and arresting those on board, following a protest against 
Russian oil activities in the Arctic by member of Greenpeace on board the vessel, 
which had included attempting to get onto a Russian oil platform on Russia’s 
continental shelf in the Pechora Sea.23 The tribunal also decided that the Netherlands 
was entitled to compensation for damage to the Arctic Sunrise, the wrongful arrest 
and detention of the Greenpeace protesters (known as the Arctic 30), the expenses of 
the Arctic 30 during their detention, the Netherlands’ payment of Russia’s share of the 
deposits for the costs of the arbitration, and the Netherlands’ costs in issuing a bank 
guarantee further to the provisional measures ordered by the ITLOS. The tribunal 
reserved the amount of such compensation for further decision.  
In September 2016 the tribunal appointed two experts to help it in this matter. 
As in the previous phases of the case, Russia declined to participate in the 
compensation proceedings. The tribunal delivered its award on compensation on 10 
July 2017, determining that Russia should pay the Netherlands compensation totalling 
some €5.4 million, plus interest.24 That compares with some €8.2 million claimed by 
the Netherlands. The tribunal’s total was broken down as follows: damage to the 
Arctic Sunrise, €1.7 million; non-material damage to the Arctic 30, €0.6 million; 
damage resulting from the measures taken by Russia against the Arctic 30, €2.5 
                                                 
23 In the Matter of the Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia), Award on the Merits, 14 
August 2015, available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1438; accessed 3 October 2016. 
The award is discussed in the previous Survey: see R. Churchill, ‘Dispute Settlement in the Law of the 
Sea: Survey for 2015, Part II and 2016’ (2017) 32 IJMCL 379-426 at 403-10. 
24 In the Matter of the Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia), Award on Compensation, 10 
July 2017, available at https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2214; accessed 23 May 2018. 
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million; costs incurred for the issue of a bank guarantee, €13,500; and deposits for the 
costs of the arbitration, €625,000. In calculating those sums, the tribunal made 
considerable reference to the case law of other international courts and tribunals and 
the work of the International Law Commission.        
Given that Russia did not accept the tribunal’s award on the merits, it seems 
unlikely that it will pay the compensation awarded to the Netherlands by the tribunal.  
           
 The “Enrica Lexie” Incident Arbitration (Italy v. India)  
In 2015 Italy initiated arbitration proceedings under Annex VII against India in 
relation to an incident that occurred in February 2012.25 According to Italy, the 
parties’ dispute arises from an incident approximately 20.5 nm off the coast of 
southern India (i.e. in India’s EEZ) involving the MV Enrica Lexie, an oil tanker 
flying the Italian flag and en route from Sri Lanka to Djibouti, and India’s subsequent 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over two Italian marines from the Italian Navy who 
were on board the ship. On the other hand, according to India, the incident concerns 
the killing of two Indian fishermen on board an Indian vessel by the two Italian 
marines and the subsequent exercise of its criminal jurisdiction over the two marines. 
In its statement of claim, Italy argues that India has violated numerous provisions of 
the LOSC by exercising jurisdiction over the Enrica Lexie and the two marines and by 
failing to cooperate in the repression of piracy. The tribunal hearing the case 
comprises Judge Golitsyn (president), Judge Paik, Judge Robinson, Professor 
Francioni and Judge Rao. In 2015 the ITLOS made an order of provisional measures 
                                                 
25 Italy’s notification and statement of claim are available at 
http://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/Notification/Italys%20Notification%20(Redacted).pdf; accessed 10 
June 2016. 
23
under Article 290(5) of the LOSC pending the constitution of the tribunal.26 The 
tribunal itself made a further order of provisional measures in 2016.27 
 The main development of note in the case during 2017 was that India, when 
submitting its counter-memorial in April 2017, included a counter-claim. The website 
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which is acting as the registry for the 
arbitration, does not give any details of India’s counter-claim. The tribunal has left 
open for the time being the question of whether it will deal with the admissibility of 
the counter-claim as part of an award on jurisdiction and merits or whether it will 
address it separately at an earlier stage.28   
       
Dispute concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov and 
Kerch Strait case (Ukraine v. the Russian Federation) 
In September 2016 Ukraine began arbitration proceeding against Russia in accordance 
with Annex VII of the LOSC by serving it with a notification and statement of claim, 
alleging that Russia had violated its (Ukraine’s) rights as the coastal State in the 
waters off Crimea. The tribunal hearing the case comprises Judge Paik (president), 
Judge Bouguetaia, Judge Gómez-Robledo, Professor Vaughan Lowe (appointed by 
Ukraine) and Judge Golitsyn (appointed by Russia). The most significant publicly 
recorded development in the case during 2017 was the adoption by the tribunal of its 
Rules of Procedure on 18 May.29 Article 13 of the Rules envisages the completion of 
                                                 
26 The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India), Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures, 
Order of 24 August 2015, available at 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.24_prov_meas/C24_Order_24.08.2015_
orig_Eng.pdf; accessed 14 October 2016. The Order is discussed in a previous Survey: see Churchill (n 
14), at pp. 576-580. 
27 The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India), Request for Provisional Measures, Order of 29 April 
2016, available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1707; accessed 3 October 2016. The 
Order is discussed in the previous Survey: see Churchill (n 23), at pp. 413-416.  
28 Procedural Order No. 3 of 1 June 2017, available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2145; 
accessed 19 May 2018.  
29 Available at https://pcacases.com/websendAttach/2136; accessed 23 May 2018. 
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the written proceedings by September 2019 if there are no preliminary objections to 
jurisdiction or admissibility. 
 It is encouraging that unlike in the Arctic Sunrise case, where it declined to 
participate in any of the proceedings, Russia has so far participated fully in this case, 
by nominating an arbitrator, appointing an agent and a legal team (which includes a 
number of non-Russian lawyers), and taking part in the meeting between the parties 
and the tribunal to discuss the Rules of Procedure.30        
 
 
Arbitration in accordance with Annex VIII 
 
As at the beginning of 2017 no disputes had been referred to arbitration in accordance 
with Annex VIII and that remained the position at the end of the year. Given that only 
eleven parties to the LOSC (three of which are landlocked) have so far selected 
Annex VIII arbitration as one of their preferred means of settlement, the chances of a 
dispute being referred to such arbitration are currently rather small. 
 
 
Compulsory Conciliation  
 
In April 2016 Timor-Leste initiated compulsory conciliation proceedings against 
Australia in relation to a dispute over their maritime boundary under Article 298(1)(a) 
and section 2 of Annex V of the LOSC. In September 2016 the Conciliation 
                                                 
30 See PCA Press Release of 22 May 2017, available at https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2135; 
accessed 23 May 2018. 
25
Commission, comprising Ambassador Peter Taksøe-Jensen (chairman), Dr. Rosalie 
Balkin, Judge Abdul Koroma, Professor Donald McRae and Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum, 
rejected a challenge by Australia to its competence.31 According to Annex V of the 
LOSC, the Commission then had 12 months in which to complete its work. It did not 
meet that deadline, nor had it completed its work by the end of 2017. Nevertheless, it 
is clear from a series of press releases issued by the Commission during the year that 
it made good progress during 2017.32  
 The Commission met with the parties at roughly two month intervals. In 
January 2017, as part of confidence-building measures promoted by the Commission, 
Timor-Leste withdrew its claims in two arbitrations that it had commenced against 
Australia concerning disputes relating to the Treaty on Certain Maritime 
Arrangements in the Timor Sea (2006). At the same time it notified Australia of its 
termination of the Treaty.33 What was described as a ‘breakthrough’ in the 
conciliation process occurred on 30 August 2017 when the parties reached a 
“Comprehensive Package Agreement” on the central elements of a maritime boundary 
delimitation between them in the Timor Sea; the legal status of, and establishment of 
a special regime for, the Greater Sunrise gas field; a pathway to development of the 
field; and the sharing of its resources.34 In October, the parties reached agreement on a 
draft treaty embodying the Comprehensive Package Agreement.35 It was expected that 
the treaty would be signed in early 2018.      
        
                                                 
31 In the Matter of a Conciliation between the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste and the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Decision on Australia’s Objection to Competence, 19 September 2016, 
available at https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1921; accessed 29 July 2017. The Decision is 
discussed in the previous Survey: see Churchill (n 23), at pp. 417-421.  
32 The press releases are available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/132; accessed 24 May 2018. 
33 Joint Statements of the Governments of Timor/Leste and Australia and the Conciliation Commission 
of 9 and 24 January 2017, available at ibid.   
34 Press Release No. 9 of 1 September 2017, available at ibid. 
35 Press Release No. 10 of 5 October 2017, available at ibid. 
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 Judicial Settlement of Law of the Sea Disputes outside the Framework of Section 
2 of Part XV of the LOSC  
 
International Court of Justice 
At the beginning of 2017 four law of the sea cases were pending before the Court – 
the Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and 
Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast (Nicaragua v. 
Colombia) case; the Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in 
the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) case; the Maritime Delimitation in the 
Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) case; and the 
Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya) case. The first two 
cases were all referred to the Court in 2013; the last two in 2014. In the first 
Nicaragua/Colombia case and the Costa Rica/Nicaragua case the year 2017 saw, 
respectively, the continuation of the written proceedings phase and the oral 
proceedings phase. However, there were more significant developments in the other 
two cases, where the Court made an order and gave a judgment concerning matters of 
admissibility and jurisdiction. Those decisions are discussed below.  
 
Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the 
Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) 
In 2013, Nicaragua instituted proceedings against Colombia claiming that Colombia 
had not complied with the ICJ’s judgment in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute 
(Nicaragua v. Colombia) case, given in 2012, and had violated Nicaragua’s rights 
resulting from that judgment. Nicaragua sought to found the Court’s jurisdiction on 
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Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá or, in the alternative, on the Court’s “inherent 
power to pronounce on the actions required by its Judgments.”36 Following 
preliminary objections to its jurisdiction by Colombia, the Court delivered a judgment 
on the matter in March 2016, rejecting all but one of Colombia’s preliminary 
objections.37  
In November 2016 Colombia filed its counter-memorial, which contained four 
counter-claims, namely: (1) and (2) alleged breaches by Nicaragua of its duties of due 
diligence to protect and preserve the marine environment of the south-west Caribbean 
Sea and to protect the right of the inhabitants of the San Andrés Archipelago to 
benefit from a healthy, sound and sustainable environment; (3) an alleged 
infringement by Nicaragua of the customary artisanal rights of those inhabitants to 
access and exploit their traditional fishing grounds; and (4) an alleged denial by 
Nicaragua of Colombia’s rights as a result of the straight baselines established by 
Nicaragua in 2013 that had the effect of extending Nicaragua’s internal waters and 
maritime zones beyond what international law permitted. In early 2017, Nicaragua 
informed the Court that it considered those counter-claims to be inadmissible. 
Following the submission of written observations by each party, the Court made an 
order on the question on 15 November 2017.38  
Under Article 80 of the Court’s Rules, a counter-claim is admissible only if it 
comes within the jurisdiction of the Court and is “directly connected” with the subject 
matter of the claim of the other party. The Court found that the first two counter-
                                                 
36 Application of Nicaragua, para. 18, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/155/17978.pdf; 
accessed 25 May 2016.  
37 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. 
Colombia), Preliminary Objection, Judgment of 17 March 2016, available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/155/18948.pdf; accessed 25 May 2016. The Judgment was discussed in the 
previous Survey: see Churchill (n 23), at pp. 423-424. 
38 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. 
Colombia), Counter-Claims, Order of 15 November 2017, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/155/155-20171115-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf; accessed 25 May 2018. 
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claims were not so connected because the alleged facts underlying Colombia’s 
counter-claim and Nicaragua’s claim were different and did not relate to the same 
factual complex. Furthermore, there was no direct legal connection between the 
counter-claim and the claim as the legal principles relied on by each party were 
different as they did not have the same legal aim. On the other hand, Colombia’s third 
counter-claim did have a direct connection with Nicaragua’s claim as the facts 
underpinning them were of the same nature and they were both concerned with the 
scope of a coastal State’s rights and obligations in the EEZ. Likewise, there was a 
direct connection between Colombia’s fourth counter-claim and Nicaragua’s claim as 
both concerned provisions of domestic law adopted around the same time, alleged 
violation of each party’s respective sovereign rights, and had the same legal aim of 
establishing that the other party’s legislation was contrary to international law. 
That left the question of whether the third and fourth counter-claims fell 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. In its 2016 judgment, referred to above, the Court 
had found that the only jurisdictional basis for Nicaragua’s claim was Article XXXI 
of the Pact of Bogotá. Nicaragua argued that the Court had no jurisdiction over 
Colombia’s counter-claims as the critical date for determining such jurisdiction was 
the date on which the counter-claims were made, by which time Colombia had 
denounced the Pact of Bogotá and was no longer a party. Moreover, two of the 
conditions for the application of Article XXXI were not satisfied: first, there was no 
dispute between the parties concerning the third counter-claim; second, the parties had 
not determined that their disputes concerning the third and fourth counter-claim could 
not be settled by negotiation.  
The Court disagreed with those arguments. It observed that once it had 
jurisdiction to hear a case, that jurisdiction covered all phases of the cases, including 
29
counter-claims, regardless of whether (as here) the basis of that jurisdiction had 
lapsed after the applicant State had instituted proceedings. Were that not so, an 
applicant might be able to deprive the respondent of the possibility of making a 
counter-claim by withdrawing its consent to the Court’s jurisdiction after the 
commencement of proceedings.  
Turning to the conditions that had to be satisfied if Article XXXI was to serve 
as the basis of its jurisdiction, the Court found that there was a dispute concerning 
Colombia’s third counter-claim because the parties had opposing views on the scope 
of their respective rights and duties in Nicaragua’s EEZ and Nicaragua was aware that 
its claims were positively opposed by Colombia. As to the condition that the issues 
involved in Colombia’s third and fourth counter claims could not, in the opinion of 
the parties, be settled by direct negotiations, the Court observed in relation to the third 
counter-claim that the parties had never initiated direct negotiations to try to resolve 
the issues involved. That showed that they did not consider that there was a possibility 
of resolving their dispute over traditional fishing rights by direct negotiations. The 
condition was also fulfilled in respect of Colombia’s fourth counter-claim because 
Colombia’s protest against Nicaragua’s straight baselines decree showed that it would 
not have been useful for the parties to have engaged in direct negotiations. The 
Court’s conclusions here are perhaps less than wholly convincing. It does not 
necessarily follow that if negotiations have not been attempted or there has been a 
protest, a dispute cannot be settled by negotiation. In practice, protests are often 
followed by negotiations. 
Overall, therefore, the Court held that it had jurisdiction in respect of 
Colombia’s third and fourth counter-claims and that the latter were accordingly 
admissible. The Court further decided that as a consequence, it was necessary for 
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Nicaragua to file a Reply and Colombia a Rejoinder, the latter to be done by 15 
November 2018.            
 
Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya) 
In 2014 Somalia instituted proceedings against Kenya in respect of their disputed 
maritime boundary: it sought to found the Court’s jurisdiction on the declarations 
made by itself and Kenya under Article 36(2) of the Court’s Statute. In October 2015, 
Kenya raised certain preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and the 
admissibility of the application. On 2 February 2017 the Court delivered its judgment 
on those matters.39  
 Kenya argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction because of a reservation 
contained in its declaration under Article 36(2), which excluded from the Court’s 
jurisdiction “disputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have agreed or shall 
agree to have recourse to some other method or methods of settlement.” According to 
Kenya, there were two such agreed methods of settlement that were relevant, a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the two States concluded in 200940 
and Part XV of the LOSC.  
Under the MOU each party agreed not to object to the other’s submission to 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf relating to the establishment of 
                                                 
39 Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 
2 February 2017, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/161/161-20170202-JUD-01-00-
EN.pdf; accessed 26 May 2018. For early comment, see N. Bankes, ‘The Relationship between 
Declarations under the Optional Clause of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and Part XV 
of the Law of the Sea Convention’, JCLOS Blog, posted 10 February 2017, available at 
http://site.uit.no/jclos/2017/02/10/the-relationship-between-declarations-under-the-optional-clause-of-
the-statute-of-the-international-court-of-justice-and-part-xv-of-the-law-of-the-sea-convention/#more-
397; accessed 4 June 2018; and M. Benatar and E. Franckx, ‘The ICJ’s Preliminary Objections 
Judgment in Somalia v. Kenya: Causing Ripples in Law of the Sea Dispute Settlement?’, EJIL: Talk! 
Blog, posted 22 February 2017, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-icjs-preliminary-objections-
judgment-in-somalia-v-kenya-causing-ripples-in-law-of-the-sea-dispute-settlement/#more-15010; 
accessed 4 June 2018.   
40 The MOU is reproduced in para. 37 of the Judgment. 
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the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Paragraph 6 of the MOU 
stated that “delimitation of maritime boundaries in the area under dispute . . . shall be 
agreed between” the two States after the Commission had given its recommendations 
in response to each party’s submission. While the Court found the MOU to be a valid 
treaty and therefore binding on the parties (a matter that Somalia had initially 
contested), it concluded that paragraph 6 of the MOU, read in its context and in the 
light of its object and purpose, ‘sets out the expectation of the Parties that an 
agreement would be reached on delimitation of the continental shelf after receipt of 
the [Commission’s] recommendations. It does not, however, provide a method of 
dispute settlement” and therefore fell outside the scope of Kenya’s reservation to its 
declaration under Article 36(2) of the Court’s Statute (para. 106). In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court was strongly influenced by the similarity of wording between 
paragraph 6 of the MOU and Article 83(1) of the LOSC, which was to be considered 
as a relevant rule of international law in accordance with Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In the view of the Court, Article 83(1) 
“does not prescribe the method for the settlement of any dispute concerning the 
delimitation of the continental shelf” (para. 90). Furthermore, paragraph 6 of the 
MOU related only to a continental shelf boundary, not to delimitation of the parties’ 
territorial sea and EEZ boundaries, which were also in dispute. That part of the 
Court’s judgment dealing with the MOU is notable for its extensive references to the 
Vienna Convention. 
 Turning to Kenya’s argument that Part XV of the LOSC was an agreed 
method of dispute settlement and therefore excluded the Court’s jurisdiction in 
accordance with Kenya’s declaration under Article 36(2), the Court observed that 
where States had agreed a procedure to settle a dispute that fell within the terms of 
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Article 282 of the LOSC, that procedure applied instead of the compulsory dispute 
settlement procedures of section 2 of Part XV. Article 282 provides that if the parties 
to a dispute concerning the LOSC “have agreed, through a general, regional or 
bilateral agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of any party to 
the dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure 
shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in [Part XV of the LOSC].” The 
Court held that the phrase “or otherwise” in Article 282 included declarations made 
under Article 36(2) of its Statute, a finding confirmed by the travaux préparatoires. 
That was so even if such a declaration had a reservation (as Kenya’s did) that 
excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction disputes in respect of which the States 
concerned had agreed on another method of settlement. In reaching that conclusion, 
the Court was influenced by the fact that a majority of declarations under Article 
36(2), both at the time that the LOSC was negotiated and at the present time, contain 
reservations similar to that of Kenya. The Court also noted that if it had reached the 
contrary conclusion, it would have achieved precisely the opposite result from that 
intended by Article 282, which was to give priority to declarations under Article 
36(2). The Court did, however, note that if such a declaration “excluded disputes 
concerning a particular subject (for example, a reservation excluding disputes relating 
to maritime delimitation)”, section 2 of Part XV would apply (para. 128).     
 The Court dealt briefly with Kenya’s two arguments that Somalia’s 
application was inadmissible. The first was essentially a repetition of its argument 
concerning Article 6 of the MOU. The second argument was that the application was 
inadmissible because Somalia had breached the MOU by objecting to the 
consideration of Kenya’s submission by the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf and thus had not come to the Court with “clean hands”. The Court 
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rejected that argument. It observed that the fact that a party might have breached a 
treaty at issue in a case did not per se affect the admissibility of an application. 
Furthermore, Somalia was not relying on the MOU as an instrument conferring 
jurisdiction on the Court or as a source of substantive law governing the merits.  
 Overall, therefore, the Court found both that it had jurisdiction to consider 
Somalia’s application and that the application was admissible.41 Following delivery of 
the judgment, written proceedings in the main action continue. On the same day as the 
judgment, the Court made an order fixing 10 December 2017 as the time-limit for 
Kenya to file its counter-memorial on the merits.42  
 Questions may be raised about the implications of the Court’s judgment in the 
present case. Whether the Court will have jurisdiction in law of the sea disputes in 
future where an applicant seeks to found that jurisdiction on declarations made under 
Article 36(2) of the Court’s Statute would seem to depend on the nature of the 
reservations (if any) that the parties to the dispute have made to their declarations. 
The distinction between specific reservations and reservations such as Kenya’s in the 
present case is not wholly convincing and may be a fine one. While the Court 
discounted Kenya’s reservation on the basis of Article 282, Kenya’s intention with its 
reservation, and presumably the intention of other States making similar reservations, 
was clearly to express a preference for resolving disputes concerning the 
interpretation or application of the LOSC, of whatever nature, through the dispute 
settlement machinery of section 2 of Part XV of the LOSC. On the other hand, if the 
applicant in the above scenario were to initiate proceedings under section 2 of Part 
XV of the LOSC instead of before the ICJ, it is possible that the LOSC dispute 
                                                 
41 There were a number of declarations, separate opinions and dissenting opinions. For an overview of 
their content, see Bankes (n 39). 
42 Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Order of 2 February 2017, available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/161/19346.pdf; accessed 26 May 2017. 
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settlement body concerned might decline jurisdiction on the basis of Article 282 of 
the LOSC, especially in the light of the ICJ’s judgment in the present case.     
   
 
Arbitration 
 
At the beginning of 2017 three law of the sea arbitrations outside the framework of 
the LOSC dispute settlement procedures were pending – one between Croatia and 
Slovenia, and two between Timor-Leste and Australia. During the year, proceedings 
in the latter two cases were terminated, as noted above, but in the Croatia/Slovenia 
case the tribunal delivered its final award, discussed below.  
 
Croatia-Slovenia 
Under an agreement between Croatia and Slovenia concluded in 2009, brokered by 
the European Union in order that Slovenia should lift its veto on Croatia’s accession 
to the EU, an arbitral tribunal was requested to determine the following matters: the 
course of the land and maritime boundaries between Croatia and Slovenia; Slovenia’s 
“junction to the High Sea;” and “the regime for the use of the relevant maritime 
areas.”43 A tribunal was constituted in 2012 and began its work. Following the rather 
extraordinary disruption to the course of the proceedings in 2015,44 the arbitral 
tribunal, by that stage comprising Judge Gilbert Guillaume (president), Ambassador 
                                                 
43 Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Government of 
the Republic of Croatia, 4 November 2009, Art. 3(1), available at 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2165; accessed 25 May 2018.  
44 See the previous Survey; Churchill (n 23), at pp. 424-426.  
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Rolf Einar Fife, Professor Vaughan Lowe, Professor Nicolas Michel and Judge Bruno 
Simma, delivered its final award, dealing with the merits, on 29 June 2017.45  
 Nearly half of the 370-page award is concerned with the course of the land 
boundary between Croatia and Slovenia and therefore falls outside the scope of this 
article. The first maritime issue with which the tribunal had to deal was the status of a 
bay known in Croatia as the Bay of Savudrija/Piran and in Slovenia as the Bay of 
Piran, which the tribunal, to preserve neutrality, refers to simply as “the Bay” (para. 
771 of the award). The land boundary between Croatia and Slovenia terminates in the 
south-east corner of the Bay. Thus, the southern entrance point of the Bay (Cape 
Savudrija) and its southern shoreline are located in Croatia, while the northern 
entrance point (Cape Madona) and the remaining shoreline are located in Slovenia. 
The distance between the two entrance points is 2.7 nm. 
The tribunal found that before the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991, the Bay 
was a juridical bay within the meaning of Article 7 of the 1958 Territorial Sea 
Convention and Article 10 of the LOSC and thus had the status of internal waters. 
After 1991, the Bay became bordered by Croatia and Slovenia as the successors of 
Yugoslavia. However, the tribunal held that such State succession did not change the 
previous status of the Bay as internal waters (para. 883). It found support for that 
                                                 
45 In the Matter of an Arbitration under the Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Final Award, 29 June 2017, 
available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2172; accessed 25 May 2018. For early 
comment, see N. Bankes, ‘The Maritime Aspects of the Award in the Arbitration between Croatia and 
Slovenia’, JCLOS Blog, posted 19 July 2017, available at http://site.uit.no/jclos/2017/07/19/the-
maritime-aspects-of-the-award-in-the-arbitration-between-croatia-and-slovenia/#more-450; accessed 4 
June 2018; A. Oude Elferink, ‘Slovenia/Croatia arbitration – Is the territorial sea delimitation 
consistent with the case law on maritime delimitation?’, JCLOS Blog, posted 16 August 2017, 
available at http://site.uit.no/jclos/2017/08/16/sloveniacroatia-arbitration-is-the-territorial-sea-
delimitation-inconsistent-with-the-case-law-on-maritime-delimitation/#more-454; accessed 4 June 
2018; and A. Solomou, ‘A Commentary on the Maritime Delimitation Issues in the Croatia v. Slovenia 
Final Award’, EJIL: Talk! Blog, posted 15 September 2017, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-
commentary-on-the-maritime-delimitation-issues-in-the-croatia-v-slovenia-final-award/; accessed 4 
June 2018. 
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position in the judgment of the ICJ in the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier case 
regarding the Gulf of Fonseca.46 However, it may be questioned how much support 
that case offers as the ICJ found that the Gulf was an historic bay and that determined 
the status of its waters prior to the succession of El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua 
as riparian States to Spain in 1821. Returning to the present case, the tribunal noted 
that the fact that Article 7 of the 1958 Convention and Article 10 of the LOSC apply 
only to bays bordered by a single State did not imply that those articles “exclude the 
existence of bays with the character of internal waters, the coasts of which belong to 
more than one State” (para. 884). That conclusion is not entirely convincing. The fact 
that the Convention articles do not exclude the possibility that the waters of bays 
bordered by more than one State are internal, does not necessarily mean that such 
waters do have that status, as the tribunal implies.47  
The tribunal went on to consider the boundary between the parties in the Bay. 
It decided that as there were no provisions in the 1958 Conventions or the LOSC 
dealing with the delimitation of overlapping internal waters, the boundary between 
Croatia and Slovenia within the Bay should be delimited “on the basis of the same 
principles as are applicable” to the delimitation of land territories (para. 886). In the 
present case the delimitation had to be made on the basis of uti possidetis. As there 
had been no dividing line in the Bay before the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991, 
“[d]elimitation must thus be made on the basis of the effectivités at the date of 
independence” (para. 888). In this connection the tribunal noted that the Slovenian 
                                                 
46 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) Case, 
Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1992, p. 351, paras 385 and 401. 
47 State practice on the status of waters in bays bordered by more than one State is ambiguous, although 
admittedly most such practice does not concern situations of State succession. Further on this question, 
see C. R. Symmons, ‘The Maritime Border Area of Ireland, North and South: An Assessment of 
Present Jurisdictional Ambiguities and International Precedents relating to Delimitation of “Border 
Bays”’ (2009) 24 IJMCL 457-500, especially at 464-475; and F. Talaie, ‘The Issue of the Delimitation 
of Multi-State Bays in the International Law of the Sea’ (1999) 18 University of Tasmania Law Review 
22-64.  
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coastline in the Bay was relatively densely populated, whereas the Croatian coastline 
had been deserted for centuries; that fishing in the Bay had primarily been regulated 
by Slovenia; and that most policing in the Bay had been carried from Slovenia. In 
2001 the parties had initialled a draft border agreement which divided the Bay by a 
line running from the mouth of the Dragonja River (the terminus of the land border) 
to a point on the closing line of the Bay (referred to as Point A) that was three times 
as far from Cape Madona as from Cape Savudrija. The tribunal considered that the 
line in the 2001 draft agreement “corresponds to the effectivités it has been able to 
determine and will adopt it” (para. 912). As a result, the overwhelming proportion of 
the Bay belongs to Slovenia, the exception being a narrow strip of water close to the 
Croatian coastline. 
The next issue for the tribunal was delimitation of the territorial sea boundary 
between Croatia and Slovenia. The tribunal noted that the applicable law was Article 
15 of the LOSC, and also the similarity of the methods of delimitation for all maritime 
zones, which was to begin with the construction of an equidistance line and then 
consider whether that line required adjustment in the light of any special 
circumstances. Accordingly, the tribunal began by constructing what it describes as an 
equidistance line “using all available base points on the coasts of Croatia and 
Slovenia, extending from Point A out to the intersection of the equidistance line with 
the maritime boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia established by the Treaty of 
Osimo, 1975” (para. 1003). There is something rather curious about this so-called 
equidistance line. It appears to ignore the fact that the closing line drawn across the 
mouth of the Bay is part of the baseline. That would mean that the first part of an 
equidistance line would be perpendicular to the closing line of the Bay. That does not 
appear to be the case, although admittedly the small-scale of the map in the award 
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means that one cannot be absolutely sure. What is certain, however, is that where the 
controlling basepoints are Capes Madona and Savudrija, a significant part of the so-
called equidistance line is nowhere near being equidistant because the starting point of 
the line, Point A, is located so much closer to Croatia than Slovenia.   
Be that as it may, the tribunal then went on to consider whether there were any 
special circumstances that would render its equidistance line “inapposite for the 
definitive maritime boundary” (para. 1005). It decided that there was one such 
circumstance. That was the fact that Croatia’s controlling basepoints were located on 
only a small stretch of its coast since beyond Cape Savudrija the direction of the coast 
turns to face south-west. Croatia’s basepoints had the effect of deflecting the 
equidistance line significantly northwards and exaggerated Slovenia’s boxed-in effect. 
Accordingly, the tribunal decided to adjust its equidistance line southwards to form 
the territorial sea boundary between Croatia and Slovenia. That line was 
approximately parallel to Slovenia’s territorial sea boundary with Italy and attenuated 
the boxed-in nature of Slovenia’s maritime space.48        
 The next issue for the tribunal was “Slovenia’s junction to the High Sea”. It 
began by defining the terms used in that phrase. It considered “High Sea” to mean the 
area in which high seas freedoms of navigation, overflight and the laying of cables 
and pipelines could be exercised, in other words areas beyond the territorial sea. It 
decided that “junction” had its ordinary dictionary meaning as the physical location of 
a connection between two or more areas, and could refer either to “a geographical 
point or line, without spatial extension, or an area” (para. 1077). The tribunal 
therefore concluded that the phrase “Slovenia’s junction to the High Sea” meant “the 
connection between the territorial sea of Slovenia and an area beyond the territorial 
                                                 
48 For strong criticism of this part of the award, see Oude Elferink (n 45). 
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seas of Croatia and Italy” (para. 1076). The tribunal noted that in determining the area 
of the junction, it was mandated by Article 4(b) of the Arbitration Agreement to apply 
“international law, equity and the principle of good neighbourly relations in order to 
achieve a fair and just result by taking into account all relevant circumstances.” 
According to the tribunal, those circumstances were primarily the access of ships and 
aircraft to and from Slovenia and the exercise of jurisdiction over such ships and 
aircraft. The tribunal decided that the junction area would be an elongated area of 
Croatia’s territorial sea about 2.5 nm in width and roughly seven or eight nm in 
length. To the north-east this area was bounded by the Croatia-Slovenia territorial sea 
boundary, to the west by the Croatia-Italy territorial sea boundary, in the south-east by 
the outer limit of Croatia’s 12 nm territorial sea, with the eastern side, lying within 
Croatia’s territorial sea, being a line roughly parallel to the western side of the area.   
 The final issue for the tribunal was to determine “the regime for the use of the 
relevant maritime areas”, for which again it was to apply the provisions of Article 
4(b) of the Arbitration Agreement. The tribunal considered that no special regime was 
required for any “maritime area” other than the junction area. For that area the 
tribunal determined that the regime for ships and aircraft, of whatever nationality, 
travelling to or from Slovenia should be the same as the freedoms set out in Article 
58(1) of the LOSC (on the rights of other States in a coastal State’s EEZ). The 
tribunal stressed that that regime differed both from innocent passage in the territorial 
sea and transit passage through international straits. There should also be freedom to 
lay cables and pipelines, subject to the coastal State’s powers under Article 79 of the 
LOSC. Croatia would be entitled to prescribe laws and regulations for foreign ships 
and aircraft in the junction area that gave effect to generally accepted international 
standards in accordance with Article 39(2) and (3) of the LOSC (which deal with 
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transit passage through international straits), but it could not enforce such laws and 
regulations in the junction area, although it could do so elsewhere in accordance with 
international law. The tribunal emphasised that the rights and obligations of the 
parties under the regime must be exercised in good faith and with due regard for the 
rights and obligations of other States, Furthermore, the parties should cooperate with 
each other and with other States, and in this connection the tribunal recalled Article 
123 of the LOSC (on cooperation between States bordering enclosed and semi-
enclosed seas). The tribunal was satisfied that the regime that it had prescribed for the 
junction area was “consistent with [the] basic principles” of the LOSC and therefore 
did not violate the prohibition in Article 311(3) of the LOSC on the conclusion of 
agreements that affect the application of those principles (para. 1140).  
To some eyes the special regime for the junction area devised by the tribunal 
may seem overly ambitious, given the unclear and ambiguous provision of the 
Arbitration Agreement on which it is based. However, it is worth noting that in its 
pleadings Croatia had accepted that the purpose of the provisions in the Arbitration 
Agreement concerning the junction was to ensure secure access for ships navigating 
between the high seas and Slovenian waters.49 Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how 
the rights intended for third States by the special regime could be enforced by such 
States, given that the award applies between the two parties only.            
 The tribunal’s decision was unanimous on all points. On the day that the 
award was delivered, the Prime Minister of Croatia made a statement that the award 
did not in any way bind Croatia and Croatia would not implement it.50 In December 
2017 Croatia invited Slovenia not to take any action unilaterally to implement the 
                                                 
49 See paras. 1027, 1042, 1053, 1112 and 1113 of the award. 
50 Press Release of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 29 June 2017, available at 
http://www.mvep.hr/en/info-servis/press-releases/,28223.html; accessed 4 June 2018.  
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award and emphasised that it was willing to try to resolve outstanding boundary 
issues through negotiation.51  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Press Release of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 28 December 2017, available at 
http://www.mvep.hr/en/info-servis/press-releases/,29394.html; accessed 4 June 2018. 
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